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Value Creation 
Architectures and 
Competitive Advantage:
LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
Helmut Dietl
Susanne Royer
Uwe Stratmann
I n recent years, European automobile manufacturers have heavily restructured their value creation activities and processes. During this process of restructuring, a variety of organizational models evolved from relatively homogeneous production and distribution systems char-
acterized by strict vertical control and high levels of vertical integration. Under-
standing these fundamental changes and their strategic consequences requires a 
perspective that goes beyond ﬁrm boundaries and investigates different degrees 
of integration of the value-adding processes.
Disintegration in the automobile industry has been initiated by the reor-
ganization of production. Vehicle manufacturers had to react due to increasing 
competition from Japanese manufacturers, who initiated lean production meth-
ods at a much earlier stage. To improve production efﬁciency, manufacturing 
depth has been drastically reduced. Automobile manufacturers consolidated the 
number of direct suppliers and transferred extensive quality, quantity, time, and 
cost responsibilities—for assembly groups and modules and sometimes even for 
complete models—to their suppliers.
Whereas reorganization in production has already reached advanced lev-
els, changes in distribution are a more recent phenomenon. In the automobile 
sector, the term “distribution” is usually not limited to the sale of new cars, but 
includes complementary ﬁnance, leasing, and mobility services as well as the 
entire repair, service, and parts sector. In the past, car distribution was char-
acterized by a number of smaller brand-exclusive dealers that were strongly 
coordinated and steered by the vehicle manufacturers. Today, franchised dealer 
groups have taken responsibility for coordinating distribution networks for cer-
tain brands (importer function) or steering sub-dealer networks in Europe. Like 
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cascading supplier networks in production, large multi-brand dealer chains have 
formed new distribution structures and have taken over integrator functions 
that had previously been fulﬁlled by the automobile manufacturers themselves. 
New players are searching for opportunities to inﬂuence established distribution 
structures and to exploit value potentials. Independent actors, such as manu-
facturer-independent banks and leasing companies, offer distribution services in 
addition to their traditional ﬁnancial products. Competition is increasing, par-
ticularly in the market for after-sales services.
The current reorganization processes in the car industry are similar to the 
developments that characterized the PC industry about 20 years ago. Until 1985, 
companies like IBM and DEC controlled almost all the elements of the value 
chain. After 1985, IBM gave most activities of the production process to third 
parties. As a consequence, the whole business model shifted towards scale and 
volume. Changes in production affected distribution: the supply and distribution 
system moved from a pull to a push system, resulting in less control for IBM in 
distribution. Loss of control in production and distribution led to the disintegra-
tion and unbundling of the whole value chain. Even though the product was a 
huge success, the PC division of IBM could not sustain its competitive advan-
tage. Disintegration and modularization led to standardization. Differentiation 
shifted from the end product to the compo-
nents. As a consequence, dominant suppliers 
such as Microsoft and Intel appropriated the 
lion’s share of the total value creation. IBM’s 
PC business never recovered and in 2004 was 
sold to Lenovo, a Chinese component supplier 
and contract manufacturer.
However, other PC manufacturers were 
more successful. For example, Apple and Dell 
did not fall into this standardization trap. 
Apple’s business model regarding PC products 
is characterized by high integration and con-
trol over the total system in both production 
and distribution. Apple’s products have sys-
tem-speciﬁc software and most components 
and complementary products are developed 
and produced in-house or by quasi-integrated 
suppliers. Apple is setting its own standards 
and has strong control over related value-adding activities. In distribution, Apple 
PCs are sold exclusively by franchised stores or dealerships that are owned by 
Apple. Wholesale and retail functions are therefore very much in the hands of 
Apple. Dell, in contrast, extensively outsources production activities to third par-
ties. Dell’s value creation relies on just-in-time assembly, built-to-order supply 
and permanent improvements of the assembly processes to optimize efﬁciency 
and ﬂexibility while sourcing the components from third parties. Distribution, 
on the other hand, is highly integrated. Dell controls the customer interface and 
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differentiates its system of direct sales via phone and Internet on the basis of 
extensive electronic customer services.1
These examples from the PC industry highlight how different degrees 
of integration along the entire value chain determine the competitive position 
of individual ﬁrms. Traditional approaches tend to overlook these effects. This 
article presents the new concept of value creation architecture and demonstrates 
how it can be applied to explain the effect of inter-ﬁrm organization on the com-
petitive performance of participating ﬁrms.
Architecture of Value Creation: What Is It?
Strategic management deals with the question of how ﬁrms create value 
in terms of achieving and sustaining competitive advantage.2 The market-based, 
resource-based, dynamic capabilities, and relational views identify different 
sources of competitive advantages. From the market-based perspective, com-
petitive advantages are the result of strategic positioning in imperfect markets.3
The resource-based view identiﬁes ﬁrm-speciﬁc resources as the main source of 
sustainable competitive advantage.4 From the dynamic capabilities perspective, 
temporary competitive advantages result from risk-taking and entrepreneurial 
insights in an uncertain or complex environment.5 After a while, the insights 
diffuse and become best practice. The relational view attributes competitive 
advantages to relationship-speciﬁc assets, knowledge-sharing routines, comple-
mentary resources and capabilities, as well as effective governance mechanisms.6
It is suggested that these advantages are jointly generated in an exchange rela-
tionship and cannot be generated by one ﬁrm in isolation.7
Even though the relevance of an inter-ﬁrm perspective has been 
acknowledged,8 the integration of the sketched insights into an economically 
rooted concept of strategy and organization is not yet sufﬁciently advanced.9
There is still a lack of research regarding a systematic way of understanding the 
different components of competitive advantage that may be a consequence of 
market structure, the ﬁrm itself, or relations of the ﬁrm to other actors. Such 
relations occur in diverse qualities and types. The inter-ﬁrm proﬁt achieve-
ment can only be adequately analyzed when taking intra- as well as inter-orga-
nizational resource processes into account.10 Therefore, what is needed is an 
adequate conceptualization of competitive advantage that can actually be used 
in different industry contexts to map the underlying value creation architecture 
and relate it to economic performance.11 Certain patterns of labor division that 
emerged among co-specialized actors in a sector are called industry architec-
tures.12 Our aim is to develop a conceptualization of such architectures in rela-
tion to competitive advantage that can be used to identify and evaluate different 
value creation architectures in the same industry.
The term “value creation architecture” describes the structure and rela-
tionships of all the value-adding activities that are carried out by various actors 
and companies to bring a particular product or service to market. Figure 1 shows 
the value creating actors around the vehicle manufacturer Fiat as an example. It 
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becomes obvious that Fiat is embedded into different relationships on the pro-
duction as well as the distribution side. A horizontal partner, for example, is its 
competitor Ford, with whom Fiat shares platforms and models. In addition, Fiat 
has intense relationships with its module suppliers while looser relations exist 
with independent repair chains and dealer groups.
The concept focuses on the actors in value creation architectures that 
manufacture or assemble the ﬁnal product, i.e., the actor that is the linking pin 
between the production and the distribution side. In the car industry, the focus 
is on the vehicle manufacturers, in the PC industry on the PC manufacturers, 
in the videogame industry on the assemblers of the consoles, and so forth. This 
focus on certain players in an industry makes it not only possible to reduce 
FIGURE 1. Value Creation around Fiat Auto
Module Suppliers
E.g., Magentti Marelli
Commodity Parts
Supplier 1 to n
Ford, Chevy, GM, PSA, Suzuki, TATA
Models, Platforms and Modules
Low
integration
Tier 2
Suppliers
Tier 3
Suppliers
Banks and Leasing
Companies
Dealer Chains with
Fiat Franchise
Sub-
Dealers
Fiat-
Repairers
Sub-
Dealers
Fiat
Repairers
Fiat-Owned
Dealerships
Lateral Relationships
FIAT Auto
Horizontal
Relationships
Low/No Integration
Free Wholesalers
and Retailers
Associated
Retailers
Free Repair
Chains
Repairer
Outlets
High relationship strength, e.g. long duration of relationship, high cooperation intensity, 
high formalisation and financial interrelations.
Medium relationship strength, e.g. high cooperation intensity and long duration
but no formalised relationship, no financial interrelations.
Low relationship strength, e.g. loose relationship, discrete transactions.
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complexity, but also facilitates the identiﬁcation of generic forms of value cre-
ation architectures to be found in different industry settings. Based on this typol-
ogy, the main research question is which architectures create more value than 
others and who can appropriate the value created?
Value creation architectures are differentiated through three criteria: 
activities that are undertaken centrally; activities that are given to third parties; 
and relationship characteristics between the participating actors. The resulting 
typology is a continuum with the integrated type at one extreme and the disin-
tegrated type at the other. The integrated architecture is characterized by a high 
degree of centrally undertaken activities and a low number of activities out-
sourced to third parties. In addition, the locus of value-adding activities is within 
the boundaries of a single ﬁrm13 and all the value appropriation opportunities 
are concentrated within this ﬁrm. A good example of such an architecture can 
be found in the fashion industry where American Apparel undertakes a high 
degree of value creation activities without using sub-contractors, outsourcing, or 
off-shoring. To bring the product “fashionable textiles” to the market, the activi-
ties of knitting, dyeing, sewing, photography, marketing, distribution, and design 
are all undertaken in the facilities of American Apparel in Los Angeles.14
Disintegrated architectures, on the other hand, are characterized by 
highly decentralized, market-mediated relations between independent ﬁrms. 
In disintegrated architectures, each participating ﬁrm has control over its com-
ponents and services and competes with all the other ﬁrms within the value 
creation architecture for value appropriation. This competition results in high-
powered incentives and assures a comparatively high level of value creation. 
This advantage, however, comes at a high cost. Most of the ﬁrms that are part 
of a disintegrated architecture are forced to standardize their products, which, in 
turn, limits their differentiation options. Usually, the component manufacturer 
whose component is the one differentiating the ﬁnal product from competitive 
products from other value creation architectures will be able to appropriate a 
major part of the value created. Within disintegrated architectures, differentia-
tion is often transferred from the level of the ﬁnal product to the level of indi-
vidual components and, at the same time, made more difﬁcult because of the 
necessary standardization processes. Examples of this transfer can be found 
not only in the PC industry, but also in the sports apparel or bicycle industries, 
where consumers prefer clothes that are made of Gore-Tex and bicycle gear 
shifts from Shimano, respectively.
Quasi-integrated architectures are a hybrid form between the extremes of 
full integration and complete disintegration. The hybrid form is characterized by 
a combination of extensive outsourcing to third parties and close relationships 
with these third parties. The value creation architecture for Apple PCs offers an 
example of a quasi-integrated architecture of value creation.15
In markets where products may be separated into different modules 
and therefore be produced in integrated as well as disintegrated architectures, 
competitive advantage is not determined by the characteristics of individual 
ﬁrms alone. It is rather the result of competition among and within different 
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constellations of actors. Consider the video game industry. Reducing competi-
tion to the console manufacturers Microsoft versus Sony versus Nintendo would 
miss important aspects. Game publishers and developers as well as customers 
have to be included in the analysis of competitive advantage.16 Obviously, differ-
ent architectures may work in different competitive environments. There is not 
a single form of value creation architecture that dominates all the other forms. 
Different forms, in particular integrated versus disintegrated architectures, have 
relative advantages and disadvantages.
Architecture of Value Creation:
How Can It Be Understood?
From the perspective outlined here, unique strategic resources and strong 
capabilities are a necessary, but not sufﬁcient, condition for sustainable proﬁt-
ability. IBM had valuable resources and outstanding capabilities and created 
substantial amounts of value with its PC business. However, IBM failed to appro-
priate adequate amounts of this value because the value creation architecture 
put suppliers such as Microsoft and Intel into a favorable strategic position. To 
understand better the determinants of competitive advantage, it is essential to 
analyze the underlying value creation architecture—in particular, the levels of 
integration in production and distribution. Integrated architectures are charac-
terized by a high production and distribution depth, while disintegrated architec-
tures have a low depth of activities in both areas. The levels of production and 
distribution depth are used as an indicator of the amount of value creation by 
the focal actor.
Quasi-integrated architectures are characterized by low production and 
distribution depths combined with a high degree of control and coordination 
responsibility for the other actors in the same architecture. Therefore, next to 
understanding production and distribution depths, it is essential to analyze the 
extent of control exercised by the focal actor over the other actors. Effective gov-
ernance mechanisms to restrain opportunism here can be observed in two types: 
third-party enforcement of agreements such as legal contracts; and self-enforc-
ing agreements based on “hostages” such as ﬁnancial investments (formal safe-
guards) or goodwill, trust, and reputation (informal safeguards).17 While formal 
safeguards in the form of economic hostages align the incentives of the partners, 
informal safeguards such as trust and reputation lead to lower transaction costs 
for monitoring and bargaining.
From the perspective suggested here, actors in different industries may 
be mapped regarding their integration in the area of production in terms of 
their production depth as well as their control over other actors that contribute 
to the production of the central products. Regarding the degree of integration 
in the area of distribution, the distribution depth as well as the control over 
other actors that contribute to the distribution of the central products are 
taken into account. The results are maps that give insights into the different 
strategies of players in an industry regarding the integration, quasi-integration, 
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and disintegration of their activities in production and distribution. Different 
architectures of value creation determine the competitive potential of a product 
or service and of the different companies involved. In fact, there are two levels 
of competition. At the ﬁrst level, architectures compete against each other. This 
form of inter-architecture competition is about value creation: Which of all the 
competing architectures can gain the largest share of a certain market? At the 
second level, the ﬁrms within a certain architecture compete against each other. 
This form of intra-architecture competition is about value appropriation: Which 
ﬁrm can appropriate the largest part of the total value creation?
Architectures of value creation have to deal with the trade-off between 
differentiation and efﬁciency.18 It can be very efﬁcient to outsource many com-
ponents that are standardized from a purely cost-oriented perspective. However, 
differentiation potential may thereby be sacriﬁced. Each ﬁrm must consider this 
trade-off when it is designing the value-adding activities around a certain prod-
uct and positioning itself in intra-architecture competition. Furthermore, compe-
tent and resourceful actors have to be attracted and already participating actors 
have to be motivated to stay within the architecture and add maximum value 
in the long run. Within an architecture, a balance of incentives and contribu-
tions among participating ﬁrms is essential to be successful in inter-architecture 
competition.
From this perspective, the analysis of architectural advantages is central. 
These competitive advantages result from the interplay between internal compe-
tition and the cooperation of different actors that form an architecture of value 
creation and the competition between different architectures in the market. The 
architectures chosen in a certain market context can vary considerably in terms 
of core characteristics: the number of participating ﬁrms, the extent of integra-
tion, and the settings for the relationship levers (e.g., contract conditions or level 
of cooperation).
With regard to intra-architectural competition and cooperation, the 
analysis focuses on the question of which actors appropriate the highest share 
of value and on the impact of this value appropriation on the motivation and 
ability of all actors to continue to contribute to this architecture. The position 
of each ﬁrm within the intra-architectural competition depends on its resources, 
its capabilities, and its relationship with other actors within the architecture. 
The position of different actors in the architecture enables the investigation of 
efﬁciency (cost) and strategic (differentiation) advantages. This is the linking pin 
to the level of competition between different architectures of value creation. At 
the level of inter-architectural competition, all the ﬁrms of a certain architecture 
simultaneously enjoy architectural advantages based on the higher amount of 
total value creation by this architecture in comparison with competing architec-
tures. Figure 2 summarizes how the characteristics of value creation architec-
tures, namely, the level of integration in production (measured by production 
depth and production control) and the level of integration in distribution 
(measured by distribution depth and distribution control) result in competitive 
advantages at the intra- and inter-architectural levels.
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Case Study: The European Automobile Industry
The empirical part of this article deals with the analysis of competing 
value creation architectures in the European automobile industry. The main 
objective is to identify the effect of different architectures on performance at 
the level of the entire architecture and with regard to individual actors within 
the architecture. The analysis of architectures is on the brand and not on the 
level of a speciﬁc model. Data availability, measurement problems, and practica-
bility issues are the reasons for the analysis at brand level.
Methodology
To analyze the postulated theoretical relationship, we chose a case study 
methodology as the research strategy. Cases are a useful means to illustrate gen-
eral facts or theoretical concepts.19 The case study investigates the architectures 
of value creation of different automobile brands in Europe. A main selection 
criterion to be included in this case research is that the brand is undertaking 
value creation activities in the European market. This requires an ofﬁcial distri-
bution organization whereas the production of the marketed cars can also take 
place outside Europe. The brands should be comparable in terms of the product 
portfolio available in Europe.
General Motor’s European subsidiary Opel,20 the Mercedes Car Group, 
and Toyota Motors Europe fulﬁll these requirements and were chosen as cases 
for this research. The architectures around Opel, Mercedes-Benz, and Toyota 
cars are analyzed with regard to the identiﬁed dependent (i.e., competitive 
advantage) and independent variables (i.e., integration in production and 
FIGURE 2.  Conceptual Framework Linking Value Creation Architectures with Competitive 
Advantage
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distribution). The following subsections are based on isolated as well as com-
bined analyses of value creation architectures in production and distribution.21
The research is based on quantitative and qualitative data from the time 
period between 2002 and 2007. We used different data collection methods to 
increase the validity and generalizability of the research results. The data for 
performance indicators are mainly based on ofﬁcial documents such as annual 
reports and public statistic documents. For the analysis of the performance of 
individual actors such as franchised dealers, ﬁrm internal data are used as far 
as available. The data for the measurement of independent variables have been 
acquired through a range of different documents and studies and through con-
tract analyses. The data collection was supported by expert interviews with rel-
evant actors inside the architectures.
Operationalization of the Independent Variables
The operationalization of the independent variables follows the same 
methodology in production and in distribution. The underlying aim is the mea-
surement of the level of integrated activities and the formal and informal inte-
gration of actors inside the architecture (by the focal vehicle manufacturer). 
The following paragraphs explain the operationalization of the independent 
variables.
As highlighted in Figure 2, the level of integration in production (distribution)
is reﬂected in production (distribution) depth and formal as well as informal 
control over production- (distribution-) related actors. Production depth is mea-
sured by the level of activities in car design, parts production, and assembly that 
are carried out in-house compared with the total amount of activities required to 
produce the ﬁnal car. The measure, which can differ for each production plant, 
is aggregated to a single index for all model lines and production plants because 
this research focuses on the architectures of value creation of speciﬁc brands.22
Distribution depth reﬂects the direct involvement and intervention of vehi-
cle manufacturers in car distribution and relevant complementary distribution 
services (in particular, car service, car repair, parts sales, and ﬁnancial services).23
Distribution depth with respect to new car sales is measured as the quotient 
of direct sales by the vehicle manufacturer to total new car registrations of the 
manufacturer’s brand in the market. Vehicle manufacturers organize direct sales 
via dealerships that they own or via central sales forces within the company.
The level of integration in the area of complementary services, such as 
repair and maintenance services, parts distribution and ﬁnancial services, is 
assessed by analyzing the spectrum of distribution activities that are offered 
directly by vehicle manufacturer-owned institutions. With respect to ﬁnancial 
services, it is relevant whether the manufacturer owns or controls ﬁnancial insti-
tutions to serve different customer groups. The group of business customers—
which is continuously replacing private demand in the European automobile 
markets, for example—orders a wide spectrum of different service modules such 
as leasing packages with service and repair modules as well as ﬂeet manage-
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ment. A high degree of integration enables the vehicle manufacturer to offer its 
own ﬁnancial products to serve the demand of these customer groups.
In after-sales, vehicle manufacturers employ different strategies to partici-
pate in value-adding activities. Repair and maintenance services go along with 
the sale of parts. The value-adding process in after-sales starts with the distribu-
tion process of the new car and ends with the end-of-life of the vehicle. Fully 
integrated after-sales services require that the vehicle manufacturer is serving 
customers’ needs during the entire lifetime of a vehicle. Usually, independent 
repairers become increasingly relevant towards the end of the lifetime when car 
owners become less willing to spend their money on car repairs and servicing. 
In after-sales, the main question is what kind of integrated activities the speciﬁc 
vehicle manufacturer is conducting to control the value-adding streams during 
the entire life cycle of a vehicle.24 At the center of attention are the activities in 
parts distribution, on the wholesale level, and on the retail level.
Control over production-related actors by formal safeguards is operationalized 
by the duration and sustainability of relationships as well as the level of loca-
tion-speciﬁc investments. To manage the complexity this involves, we focus on 
the integration of direct suppliers only. Duration and sustainability of relationship
is reﬂected in the use of multiple sourcing strategies versus exclusive supplier 
relationships. Multiple-sourcing strategies are used to increase the negotiation 
power and to reach maximum price reductions. Vehicle manufacturers who fol-
low a single sourcing strategy have fewer possibilities to change and to use their 
negotiation power. Exclusive supplier relationships often go along with a long 
duration of supplier contracts. The level of location-speciﬁc investments is analyzed 
in terms of the geographic proximity of the production plants of the related sup-
pliers to the plants of the focused actor. Location-speciﬁc investments are an 
indicator of the integration of suppliers through (ﬁnancial) hostages. For exam-
ple, supplier parks next to the vehicle manufacturer’s factories in order to real-
ize just-in-time concepts imply a high degree of location-speciﬁc investments. 
There are different forms of geographic supplier integration. Extreme forms can 
be seen as a means of re-integrating production activities, e.g., if suppliers are 
working under the same roof and with vehicle manufacturer-owned machinery. 
Supplier parks are usually supported by strong contractual integration and by 
relatively long and exclusive relationships between the manufacturer and the 
respective suppliers.
Control over distribution-related actors by formal safeguards is reﬂected in 
the type of sales and franchise contracts as well as the inherent level of speciﬁc 
investments at franchised dealers. Analogous to the analysis in production, the 
assessment is based exclusively on the relationships with direct distributors.
The ﬁrst step in this assessment is the identiﬁcation of the contract type
that is used by the vehicle manufacturer to govern its relation with franchised 
dealers. There are three types of contracts. First, agency contracts represent a high 
level of integration because they locate the responsibilities for most distribu-
tion functions with the vehicle manufacturer. Second, selective franchise contracts
represent medium levels of integration in distribution by granting the vehicle 
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manufacturer quantitative and qualitative selection authority to select its deal-
ers. In addition, franchised dealers are under strict vertical selling restraints. 
Third, exclusive franchise contracts represent the lowest level of formal safeguards 
in distribution. Vehicle manufacturers who have chosen this contract type are 
not allowed to restrict the sale to other independent car retailers. They can, 
however, deﬁne exclusive market areas. Since the dealer is permitted under 
exclusive franchise contracts to wholesale cars to other retailers, the vehicle 
manufacturer is actually losing control of the retail process. Service and sales 
franchise contracts usually specify requirements regarding corporate identity, 
business equipment, personnel, and the extent of speciﬁc distribution tasks for 
the retailer. The analysis of these contractual requirements is summarized by a 
franchise complexity index to estimate the level of control exercised on franchi-
sees by vehicle manufactures.25
Level of speciﬁc investments within the dealer network is measured by the 
level of brand exclusivity at dealer outlets. The level of speciﬁc investments 
usually correlates with franchise selectivity.26 Brand-exclusive points of sales 
combined with high brand-speciﬁc sales standards imply a strong dependency 
between vehicle manufacturer and distributor. The level of speciﬁc investments 
in the dealer network is low when the brand is primarily sold via multi-fran-
chised outlets. Under these conditions, it is relatively easy for the dealer to 
replace one brand with another.
Control over external actors through informal safeguards is based on mecha-
nisms that are not explicitly designed and legitimated by third parties but have 
grown out of social beliefs, common values, and repeated interactions between 
the transaction partners.27 Important informal safeguards are shared norms and 
goals, trust,28 reputation, and personal relationships.29 They inﬂuence the extent 
of cooperation and opportunism between the parties.30 The existence of meta-
organizational goals and trust, for example, will enhance cooperation between 
the partners. In general, extensive informal safeguards support and facilitate 
cooperation by stimulating and motivating the partners to achieve common 
goals. From this perspective, the level of satisfaction with their relationship, as 
reported by the partners, may be regarded as an indicator for the achievement 
of such meta-organizational goals and for the intensity of trust, social bonds, 
and fairness—and, therefore, cooperation between the partners.31 Supplier and 
dealer satisfaction studies that consider these mechanisms are used in here to 
measure the intensity of cooperation between a manufacturer and its suppliers 
and contracted dealers.32
Table 1 summarizes the operationalization of the independent variables in 
car production and distribution. Each of the outlined attributes to measure the 
three independent dimensions in production and distribution—integrated activi-
ties, formal integration, and informal integration—was assessed on a 5-point 
scale ranging from –2 to +2. The reference point for the scale is 0 and identiﬁes 
the industry average. Accordingly, a score of +2 (–2) represents relatively high 
(low) levels of integration compared with the industry average. The overall score 
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for each of the independent variables is the rounded average of the scores for 
the underlying attributes.
Operationalization of the Dependent Variables
Architectural advantages are reﬂected by ﬁnancial performance indica-
tors, measures of innovation performance, market performance, and differen-
tiation performance. Financial performance indicators are used to operationalize 
architectural advantages. These indicators are obtained at the architectural level 
and are interpreted as the sum of all the values appropriated by the participating 
actors. To measure the ﬁnancial performance of the value creation architecture, 
the ﬁnancial performance of direct suppliers, vehicle manufacturers, and direct 
distributors is analyzed. The major ﬁnancial performance indicator is return 
on sales (RoS). Note that the performance data reﬂect the situation within the 
focused markets and for the architecture around the chosen brand.
A purely hard-data driven measurement of the ﬁnancial performance of 
suppliers and dealers inside speciﬁc architectures is problematic. Financial per-
formance data are easily available for vehicle manufacturers. However, many 
suppliers and in particular dealers do not publish ﬁnancial performance indi-
cators. In addition, a number of suppliers and dealers carry out value-adding 
Independent
Variable Production Distribution
Integrated Activities 
at the Focal Vehicle 
Manufacturer
• Activitiesa brought out by the vehicle 
manufacturer in design, component 
manufacturing and ﬁnal assemblyb
• Quotient of direct new car sales to 
total new car registrations by vehicle 
manufacturer-owned dealerships
• Integration into ﬁnancial services by 
owned ﬁnancial institutions 
• Integration into after-sales by integrated 
parts distribution activities 
Level of Formal 
Integration 
• Sustainability and exclusivity of 
formalized relationships between the 
vehicle manufacturer and its direct 
suppliers
• Integration of suppliers by ﬁnancial 
hostages in terms of location-speciﬁc 
investments undertaken by the supplier
• Contractual integration of direct dealers 
by type of contractc
• Level of speciﬁc investments required 
from the dealer in terms of contract 
standards and requirements
Level of Informal 
Integration 
• Intensity of cooperation between the 
vehicle manufacturer and its direct 
suppliers as deducted from supplier 
satisfaction studies 
• Intensity of cooperation between the 
vehicle manufacturer and its direct 
franchised dealers as deducted from 
dealer satisfaction studies
TABLE 1. Operationalization of the Independent Variables
Notes:
a. Activities have to be brought out under the roof of the focal vehicle manufacturer. 
b. All model lines produced for the focused European markets are considered.
c. Differentiation by agency, selective and exclusive new car sales contract (level of formal integration in this order).
Value Creation Architectures and Competitive Advantage
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY  VOL. 51, NO. 3  SPRING 2009  CMR.BERKELEY.EDU36
activities for different architectures. The assignment of ﬁnancial performance 
indicators to speciﬁc architectures is therefore difﬁcult. To solve this problem, the 
quantitative data were complemented by qualitative data. With regard to direct 
dealers, quantitative data were complemented by a qualitative analysis of the 
extent to which the dealer was able to fulﬁll its ﬁnancial objectives by working 
with a speciﬁc vehicle manufacturer. With respect to suppliers, quantitative data 
were complemented by studies of the price pressure put on direct suppliers by 
vehicle manufacturers. These studies were based on time series analyses of the 
relationship between the vehicle manufacturers and relevant actors (here, direct 
suppliers and the direct dealers).33 Analysis of ﬁnancial data for actors beside the 
vehicle manufacturer allows conclusions about the allocation of value appropria-
tion and about competitive forces within the architecture.
Innovation and market performance were analyzed to identify the nature of 
the competitive advantages. The technological innovation output of the value 
creation architecture was measured in terms of the quantity and commercial rel-
evance of innovations. Superior innovation performance is a strong indicator of 
entrepreneurial (Schumpeterian) advantages. Relative market share and evolu-
tion of market shares over time compared with competing architectures are indi-
cators of the market success of the relevant automobile products. Therefore, we 
took the relative sales performance of the available models as well as the annual 
growth rate of sales volumes into account. Customer satisfaction with products 
is taken into account as another indicator of the market success to measure the 
performance of the value creation architecture.
Differentiation performance measured by the relative image position is 
a major indicator of the sustainable strength and value of a brand. In the PC 
industry, modularization, standardization and outsourcing almost completely 
eliminated the differentiation potential of PC manufacturers. In the automobile 
industry, brand image is very important because many purchase decisions are 
dominated by emotional aspects.34 The brand image itself is therefore a valuable 
strategic resource for vehicle manufacturers. The relative image position of a 
brand is measured according to an annual survey of more than 300,000 readers 
of a European automobile journal.35 Table 2 summarizes the operationalization 
of the dependent variables.
Results of the Case Study Analysis
The following summarizes three cases of value creation architectures in 
the European automobile industry: Opel–Vauxhall, Mercedes Car Group, and 
Toyota Motors Europe. For each case, the independent variables are described 
ﬁrst. The resulting architecture is graphically illustrated as a “spider web.” In 
a second step, the resulting architectural types are matched with performance 
indicators.
The Case of “Opel-Vauxhall”
The architecture of value creation of GM’s European core brand Opel is 
characterized by relatively high levels of disintegration. Production depth has 
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been signiﬁcantly reduced during the last 20 years. GM/Opel had controlled a 
wide spectrum of activities in production until the late 1980s. These included 
the “Automotive Components Groups,” a separate business sector consisting 
of suppliers within GM, mainly driven by the large supplier “Delphi.” A major 
disintegration step was the separation of “Delphi” from GM in 1999. In reac-
tion to increasing competition and shrinking margins for GM/Opel, the strong 
trend towards outsourcing continued. Strategically important modules were 
outsourced to large European and U.S. suppliers, who carry out R&D and 
assembly functions for Opel. Some models are completely sourced from other 
brands out of the GM brand group (e.g., Opel Antara from Chevrolet, produced 
in the former Daewoo plant in Korea) as well as from manufacturers outside 
the GM group (e.g., Opel Agila from Suzuki Hungary). Vice versa, Opel is sup-
plying complex platforms to other manufacturers to realize economies of scale. 
Inter-brand group platform- and module-sharing increases standardization and 
modularization. For example, Fiat uses complete Opel platforms for two volume 
models. However, Opel forced the formal integration of direct suppliers by single 
sourcing agreements and by geographic integration in the form of supplier parks 
located at the European plants. All the main German production plants for Opel 
are combined with supplier parks. Compared with the industry average, how-
ever, GM/Opel is increasingly sourcing strategically less-important components 
and parts from Eastern Europe and Asian markets to realize cost reductions. The 
formal integration of these suppliers is low. Production ﬂexibility stands in con-
ﬂict with global sourcing strategies (e.g., just-in-sequence delivery). In terms of 
informal integration of suppliers, GM/Opel exhibits the lowest supplier satisfac-
tion indices for the period between 2002 and 2007.
Disintegration in distribution has been progressing since 2000. In Europe, 
Opel does not have owned dealerships and therefore has no direct control over 
new car retailing and over the complementary services in distribution. Integra-
tion in ﬁnancial services is low, too. In 2006, GM sold a 51 percent stake of the 
Dependent Variable Operationalization
Financial Performance · On the level of vehicle manufacturers: return on sales 
· On the level of direct suppliers: price pressure put on direct 
suppliers by the focal vehicle manufacturer
· On the level of direct dealers: fulﬁllment of individual ﬁnancial 
objectives of dealers by working with a speciﬁc vehicle manufacturer
Innovation Performance · Quantity and commercial relevance of innovations
Market Performance · Relative sales performance of available models
· Annual growth rates of sales volume
· Customer satisfaction
Differentiation Performance · Relative image position of the respective brand
TABLE 2. Operationalization of the Dependent Variables
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GM Acceptance Corporation (GMAC). GMAC was the ﬁnancial service entity 
within the GM organization. Formal integration of direct franchised dealers is 
below the industry average as well. Opel has a selective franchise system with 
relatively low contract requirements on franchised dealers. Opel dealers are 
not obliged to make high brand-speciﬁc investments. The contract complexity 
index is below the industry average and dealers are less ﬁnancially captured in 
the Opel world. This freedom makes it easier to add additional franchises to one 
dealer location as the total investments are lower compared with other brands. 
Multi-brand dealerships are much more dominant in the Opel dealer network 
compared with the distribution networks of other brands. As a consequence, the 
dealer is less dependent on Opel and ﬁnancial hostages are rather limited. Infor-
mal integration of dealers is on an average level within the analyzed European 
core markets. Dealer satisfaction studies indicate an average satisfaction of deal-
ers with the relationship with Opel. Figure 3 illustrates the value creation archi-
tecture for Opel in Europe.
The Case of Mercedes Car Group
The value creation architecture of Mercedes Car Group (MCG) is charac-
terized by much higher levels of integration in production and in distribution. 
In production, German manufacturers were traditionally more integrated than 
their U.S. and Japanese competitors. Most of this tradition is still reﬂected in the 
present architecture of MCG. However, Mercedes has implemented a model-
based production strategy in the meantime. Production depth for high-end 
models such as E- and S-Class models is still signiﬁcantly higher than the indus-
try average. Components and modules that competitors normally outsource to 
external suppliers are still developed and produced in-house at Mercedes. For 
example, Mercedes deﬁnes one of its core competences as producing seats for 
high-end models. In comparison, manufacturing depth is much lower for Mer-
cedes’ lower-end models, such as A- or B-Class and Smart. The Smart plant in 
Hambach (France) still holds the record with regard to the lowest manufacturing 
depth worldwide. The A- and B-Class plant in Rastatt (Germany) is fairly new 
and is combined with an industrial park for suppliers. The Mercedes M- and 
R-Classes (SUVs) are exceptions to this rule. Both models are designed for the 
American market and produced in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. The production of these 
models is characterized by low production depth combined with high integration 
levels of suppliers. Mercedes’ production strategy was traditionally character-
ized by exclusive and stable relationships with its suppliers. However, Mercedes 
has reduced tight and exclusive relationships with its suppliers in the course of 
rising cost pressure. Taking supplier satisfaction indices as indicators of informal 
integration of suppliers, these stable and long-term relationships are reﬂected in 
relatively high satisfaction scores. In summary, Mercedes’ architecture to orga-
nize production is still highly integrated to a large extent, while less integrated 
architectural designs are implemented with new plants and models.
In distribution, MCG has the highest level of integration of all the 
competitors. The number of integrated dealerships is much larger than the 
industry average. For example, about 55 percent of all new cars are sold through 
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dealerships owned by Mercedes. These dealerships not only sell new cars; they 
also control complementary products and services such as repair, maintenance, 
and ﬁnancial services. Daimler Bank offers a wide spectrum of different cus-
tomer services including extensive services in leasing and ﬂeet management. 
Private as well as business customers are attracted by specialized ﬁnancial prod-
ucts that have been created in-house. Another characteristic of MCG is the tight 
formal integration of dealers. Mercedes’ European dealer network is based on 
agency contracts and on selective franchise contracts. Unlike its competitors, 
Mercedes uses agency contracts to formalize the relationships with its direct 
dealers. In addition, all new car sales are based exclusively on consignment 
agreements. Franchise dealers are selected according to high standards and strict 
qualitative requirements resulting in extensive ﬁnancial hostages. The dealer 
network is characterized by exclusivity at the dealer level. Dealerships that sell 
Mercedes cars and cars from other than Mercedes Car Group brands are the 
exception in Europe. As a result, the mutual dependence between dealerships 
and manufacturer is comparatively high. Informal integration of direct dealers 
is also substantially higher than the industry average. Overall, relationships 
with dealers are stable and European dealers give high satisfaction scores when 
FIGURE 3. Opel’s Architecture of Value Creation
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questioned about their business relationship with Mercedes. Figure 4 summa-
rizes the value creation architecture of MCG.
The Case of Toyota Motors Europe
Toyota Motors Europe is the third case study chosen for this research on 
value creation architectures. Toyota produces ﬁve of its eight models in Europe. 
Basically, Toyota Europe employs similar production methods and organizes its 
value creation architecture like Toyota Japan. Toyota prefers a local production 
strategy and aims to be near to the markets. Toyota Europe has a horizontal 
production cooperation with Peugeot S.A. to bring a small model to the market 
(Toyota is responsible for the production in the Czech Republic). The Toyota 
production system is characterized by tight supplier relationships. Toyota started 
to outsource manufacturing much earlier than most of its competitors. Unlike 
its competitors, however, Toyota kept most of the R&D and production respon-
sibilities in-house. Toyota controls the development and design of strategic 
components and modules. Innovative technologies and products are principally 
designed and produced in-house or in collaboration with tightly integrated and 
exclusive suppliers. As soon as larger responsibilities are shifted to a supplier, 
this supplier will be integrated into the production process at a very early stage. 
FIGURE 4. Mercedes Car Group’s Architecture of Value Creation 
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Production depth for the hybrid model Toyota Prius, for example, is twice the 
industry average. Contrary to the general trend in the car industry, Toyota’s 
value creation architecture is still characterized by hierarchical supplier pyramids 
organized as so-called vertical keiretsu in which Toyota coordinates vertical sup-
plier cascades. On average, Toyota’s direct suppliers are much smaller than most 
European direct suppliers. In addition, Toyota’s direct suppliers work exclusively 
for Toyota while many larger European suppliers normally work for various 
manufacturers. The exclusive and long-term relationships within the vertical 
keiretsu are supported by ﬁnancial hostages and location- and brand-speciﬁc 
investments. More than 90 percent of all the suppliers are located within a 
radius of 100 km around the Toyota plant in order to facilitate just-in-sequence 
delivery. Toyota Europe has approximately 250 ﬁrst-tier direct suppliers, signiﬁ-
cantly fewer than the industry average. For many years, the level of informal 
integration reﬂected in supplier satisfaction scores has also been the highest 
within the industry.
In distribution, the level of integrated activities is the industry average. 
The number of centrally owned dealerships is relatively low. Toyota has its own 
bank, which offers products and services primarily for private customers. This 
reﬂects Toyota’s customer structure in Europe. Contrary to most of its European 
competitors, who sell an increasing share of cars to business customers, Toyota 
focuses on private customers. According to Toyota, these customers are loyal to 
Toyota’s franchise network and there is no need to integrate independent after-
sales actors. Formal integration of direct dealers, on the other hand, is relatively 
high. The franchised dealer network is based on a selective franchise system. 
Contract analysis reveals relatively high selection standards and requirements for 
franchised dealers. The resulting contract complexity index is above the industry 
average. Dealer integration is supported by extensive ﬁnancial hostages. Toyota 
dealers usually have mono-franchised dealer sites and exclusively sell Toyota 
products at one location. Informal integration in distribution is also above the 
industry average, as indicated by high dealer satisfaction scores. Figure 5 illus-
trates the results for Toyota.
Matching Architectures of Value Creation 
with Performance Indicators
Toyota’s quasi-integrated architecture outperforms Mercedes’ integrated 
and Opel’s disintegrated architectures despite the fact that domestic brands enjoy 
a strong initial advantage over foreign brands in the European market. Figure 6 
compares the major performance indicators for the three architectures.
Overall, value creation in the Toyota architecture is higher than in other 
architectures. Toyota’s external suppliers and dealers show a strong ﬁnancial 
performance. This may be interpreted as a signal that Toyota has not only close 
and stable but also economically fair relationships with its suppliers and deal-
ers. Intra-architectural competition is limited within the Toyota network, which 
seems to result in a fair balance of contributions to value creation and appropria-
tion of the resulting share of total value creation for all participants.36
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Within the Mercedes architecture, on the other hand, the vehicle manu-
facturer appropriates most of the value created. From 2002 until 2007, Mer-
cedes’ return on sales was 5 percent above the industry average. Compared with 
Toyota, suppliers and dealers are less satisﬁed with their ﬁnancial performance 
despite the fact that their performance is also above the industry average albeit 
at a lower degree. Suppliers and dealers are not exposed to intense intra-archi-
tectural competition but complain about the relationship between speciﬁc 
investments and ﬁnancial return.
Opel’s value creation architecture performed poorly. Most actors, includ-
ing Opel itself, accrued losses during the time period of the analysis. Franchised 
dealers report negative return on investments and suppliers complain about 
increasing price pressure and demands for further costs reductions. In addition, 
they are forced to take on more responsibilities and R&D risks. As a result, sup-
pliers and dealers are increasingly working with other vehicle manufacturers to 
reduce their dependency on Opel and to improve the efﬁciency of their facili-
ties. Overall, intra-architectural competition is high at Opel. Compared with 
Mercedes and Toyota, prices within Opel’s architecture are determined by mar-
ket power, i.e., all actors within the architecture are exposed to intense intra-
architectural competition in addition to inter-architectural competition. This 
FIGURE 5. Toyota Motors’s European Architecture of Value Creation
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additional competition forces Opel’s suppliers to improve their bargaining posi-
tion through speciﬁc investments into vehicles and platforms of different vehicle 
manufacturers.37 As a result, value appropriation is heavily impeded.
The Toyota and Mercedes architectures also outperform their competi-
tors in terms of technological innovation. At Toyota, important innovations are 
protected through strong integration of suppliers while Mercedes keeps major 
innovation competences in-house. Opel, on the other hand, invests little in 
R&D. Instead, Opel uses complex components and modules from competing 
manufacturers or sources such components from large mega-suppliers who are 
working for several manufacturers. These suppliers do not exclusively allocate 
their resources to the Opel architecture.
Toyota also has the most satisﬁed customers in Europe. As a result, deal-
ers beneﬁt from high customer and brand loyalty: independent players in after-
sales and ﬁnance play a relatively minor role in Toyota’s architecture. The fact 
that Toyota’s brand image is above average is mainly due to a good quality image 
while emotionally driven image scores are relatively low. At Mercedes, customer 
satisfaction recently suffered from reliability issues with new electronic features. 
Nevertheless, Mercedes maintained its position as one of the most desirable 
brands in Europe. These differentiation advantages can be appropriated through 
FIGURE 6. Performance Indicators for the European Market (2002-2007)
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higher retail margins, which are about 9 percent higher than those of other pre-
mium manufacturers. Opel’s customer satisfaction index and brand image suffer 
from a lack of differentiation and innovation advantages. The resulting weak 
customer loyalty further increases price pressures of inter- and, in turn, intra-
architectural competition.
In summary, there are some indications for strategic competitive advan-
tages through quasi-integration of competent and resourceful value-adding part-
ners. The purely integrated model, for example, has disadvantages with regard 
to motivation of the operative staff at the point of sale. In addition, the efﬁciency 
of vehicle manufacturer-owned dealerships is comparatively low. On the other 
hand, the disintegrated model may lead to an erosion of system control and thus 
may have a negative impact on the long-term competitiveness. However, the 
complexity of the industry does not suggest that there is a generally superior 
architecture of value creation. Further research has to identify in which contexts 
quasi-integration does outperform other types of value creation architectures.38
Concluding Summary:
Lessons from the European Automotive Industry
Our new approach to strategy and competitive advantage conceptualiza-
tion highlights architectures of value creation around certain actors as the unit 
of analysis. Value creation is at the heart of ﬁrm activities—it is the aim of ﬁrms 
to create value for their customers and thereby generate returns for the ﬁrm 
owners.39 Architectures of value creation describe the structure and relationships 
of all the value-adding activities that are carried out by various actors to bring 
a particular product or service to market. It is not limited to the value chain in 
terms of vertically linked actors, but includes all the contributions to value cre-
ation from horizontal (e.g., cooperating competitors) as well as lateral actors 
(e.g., related service providers such as banks). The concept takes two levels of 
competition into account: the competition between different value creation 
architectures (inter-architecture competition); and the competition between the 
actors in the same architecture (intra-architecture competition).
Different strategies to organize architectures of value creation are possible 
by putting different emphasis on the settings for the integration levers (e.g., con-
tract conditions or degree of ownership at the architectural facilities). Different 
organizational settings can ﬁnally lead to a similar integration level within the 
overall architecture. Relationship attributes between the central coordinator and 
its suppliers and distributors, however, seem to be key inﬂuencing factors. It has 
become obvious that an analysis that goes beyond ﬁrm boundaries is necessary 
to understand competitive advantage realization in a world of organizational 
structures that transcend ﬁrm boundaries in different architectures.
The case study underlines a growing differentiation potential and perfor-
mance output in the automobile industry with increasing control over impor-
tant value-adding actors and value-adding units. Realizing this differentiation 
potential does not automatically require a high level of in-house production and 
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distribution. Manufacturers that retain a certain depth of value-adding activities 
in the area of production as well as in the area of distribution, by concentrating 
their core competences on strategically important areas, have signiﬁcant com-
petitive advantages compared with their rivals.
In production, for example, successful manufacturers concentrate their 
resources on brand-distinctive areas such as design, power trains, or safety fea-
tures. However, coordination efforts will increase simultaneously and successful 
vehicle manufacturers have already built up resources in these areas. Suppliers 
are strictly integrated by different relationship settings (e.g., by new alliances, 
partnership models, and long-term contracts). The protection of technologi-
cal innovations and brand-distinctive features is gaining importance with rising 
power for emerging mega-suppliers who work in different value creation archi-
tectures at the same time. Product differentiation will become much more dif-
ﬁcult in the future. Manufacturers that follow an extensive outsourcing strategy 
without keeping control over suppliers will lose differentiation potential and will 
no longer be able to appropriate an adequate proportion of the values created.40
They may face the same destiny as IBM in the PC industry.
In distribution, competitive manufacturers concentrate on distribution 
control and on valuable complementary services in ﬁnance and after-sales (ser-
vice, repair, and parts). Product differentiation will no longer be a sufﬁcient 
resource for long-term competitiveness. Distribution is becoming much more 
complex due to a series of developments and increasing competition, such as 
the rising number of players, new balance of power between the traditional 
franchised dealers and the vehicle manufacturers, innovative sales channels, 
and new information and communication technologies such as the Internet. 
Regarding distribution models, a main factor for success seems to be the moti-
vation of the associated distribution partners, which will ﬁnally lead to higher 
value creation. However, the strongly hierarchical franchise model (with very 
strict franchise conditions and use of central manufacturer power) or the inte-
grated model of owning the dealerships are only two of various alternatives to 
reach a high level of integration. The attraction of valuable and loyal distributors 
depends on the brand strength and on the value creation architecture (e.g., kind 
of participating actors, relationship settings, and potential architectural advan-
tages). Other strategies to create architectural advantages currently concentrate 
on keeping control of the distribution activities by ﬁnancial participation/owner-
ship (e.g., Volkswagen’s re-integration activities in distribution). The ﬁnancial 
integration strategy is one alternative to keep control over the architecture but 
at the risk of economic inefﬁciencies. Integration by contract, by long-term part-
nership, and/or by providing an attractive architecture are other alternatives 
to realize architectural advantages. In distribution, participation in value-add-
ing activities in the complementary ﬁnance or after-sales areas is important to 
improve competitiveness.
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